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Abstention, legal style, is not an attitude toward sex or alcohol. It is,
nevertheless, confusing, unrealistic and frustrating. Abstention, a judge-
created' and fluctuating set of doctrines, requires a federal trial court to
dismiss or postpone decision of a controversy clearly within its jurisdiction,
in deference to a possible decision by a state court.2 Although theoretically
founded on considerations of equity and comity, and although asserted by
some to be imperative to the successful functioning of the federal system,
3
* This paper (with citations but without footnotes) was delivered at a joint conference of
the United States Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Tenth Circuits at Hot Springs,
Arkansas, June 29, 1976. Basic research was done by me and by my then law clerk, Jeffrey J.
Davis, now a Charlotte, North Carolina lawyer. Further research for publication was done by
Ms. Andrea Timko, a third-year law student at the University of North Carolina. I am grateful
to Mr. Davis and Ms. Timko for their painstaking and useful assistance.
' United States District Court Judge, Western District of North Carolina; President,
1960-1961, North Carolina Bar Association; Member of the Faculty of the National Institute of
Trial Advocacy, Boulder, Colorado. A.B. 1937, University of North Carolina; LL.B. 1940,
Harvard University.
1. See, e.g., England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 375 U.S. 411,415 (1964)
(abstention characterized as "a judge-fashioned vehicle"); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co.,
312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941) (abstention described as "a contribution of the courts in furthering the
harmonious relation between state and federal authority without the need of rigorous congres-
sional restriction of those powers"). Some statutorily mandated abstention does exist, how-
ever. See 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970) (relating to the assessment, levy or collection of state tax); id.
§ 1342 (dealing with rate orders of state agencies); id. § 2254 (pertaining to exhaustion of state
remedies by persons in state custody); id. § 2283 (anti-injunction statute); see text accompany-
ing notes 6-9 infra.
2. Abstention is a broad term encompassing multiple situations. The abstention doctrine,
perhaps more properly the abstention doctrines, has been invoked in at least four distin-
guishable situations: (1) to avoid decision of a federal constitutional question when the case
may be disposed of by resolution of state law questions, see, e.g., Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman
Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), discussed in text accompanying notes 23-27 infra; (2) to avoid
needless conflict with the administration by a state of its own affairs, see, e.g., Burford v. Sun
Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); (3) to leave to the states the resolution of unsettled questions of
state law, see, e.g., United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 393 (1964). But see Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943); and
(4) to ease the congestion of the federal court docket, see, e.g., P. Beiersdorf & Co. v.
McGohey, 187 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1951). Application of the abstention doctrine in the fourth
situation has been the subject of much recent criticism. See, e.g., Ashman, Alfini & Shapiro,
Federal Abstention: New Perspectives on its Current Vitality, 46 Miss. L.J. 629 (1975). See
generally C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52 (3d ed. 1976).
3. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that abstention responds to the need
for "a proper respect for state functions" in a federal system. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,
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abstention in fact frustrates the federal judiciary's most important role under
the Constitution-that of safeguarding human rights against encroachment
by all forms of government.
The role of federal courts in American government is based on the
United States Constitution. 4 It has been shaped and developed in part by acts
of Congress and in part by judicial decisions over a span of nearly two
centuries, during which period the federal courts have attempted to define
their own jurisdiction within the federal system. Abstention, roundly de-
bated by writers and judges, 5 is an essentially latter-day variant of those
efforts.
In 1793, shortly after the adoption of the Constitution, Congress passed
the Anti-Injunction Ac, 6 the ancestor of present 28 U.S.C. § 2283, 7 which
barred the federal courts from enjoining the prosecution of state court
proceedings. 8 This statute has not met with very respectful treatment. Courts
44 (1971). The Court in Younger explained that abstention represents
a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state
governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare
best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their state functions in
their separate ways.
Id. The doctrine also finds support in the traditional judicial practice of avoiding premature
decision of federal constitutional questions. See, e.g., Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman
Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941).
Historically, the doctrine derives from the chancellor's discretion to refuse to entertain
equitable suits on grounds of public policy although jurisdiction was admittedly established. See
id.
4. Article III of the United States Constitution, the judicial article, provides in § I that
[T]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § I. Article III, § 2 says in part that
[T]he judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, [and] the Laws of the United States, . . . to Controversies . . .
between a State and Citizens of another State, - between Citizens of different States,
Id. § 2. Article VI, the supremacy clause, provides that
[T]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding-
Id. art. VI.
5. E.g., Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U. CHi. L. REy.
268, 317 (1969) (abstention gives a "Bleak House aspect that. . . is too high a price to pay for
the gains in avoiding error, friction, and constitutional questions"). But see, e.g., Wright, The
Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 TEX. L. REV. 815, 824-26 (1959) (abstention is justified
and necessary whenever it serves the purposes of federalistic cooperation).
6. Act of Mar, 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 335.
7. Section 2283 in entirety presently reads: "A court of the United States may not grant
an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of
Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judg-
ments." 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970).
8. Legislative history is silent on the original rationale underlying the passage of the Act.
For possible theories, see Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 130-32 (1941). The
Supreme Court has stated that the statute "in part rests on the fundamental constitutional
independence of the States and their courts," Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of
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have historically treated it like a skunk at a picnic; they have observed it
only from afar. The federal judiciary has never squarely recognized the
statute as a limitation on its power, as opposed to its discretion, and has
carved out numerous exceptions and qualifications.
9
The anti-injunction statute did not inhibit John Marshall's efforts to
develop and define the jurisdiction of federal courts. The case of Marbury v.
Madison,II Marshall's left-handed work of genius, laid the groundwork for
the Court's self-determination of its own power, including the power to say
both what the law "is" and what the law must not be."I State laws and state
action in time came under the umbrella of federal court protection of human
rights, including property rights, against the inevitable unlawful uses of the
powers of government. 2 Three decades after passage of the Anti-Injunction
Act, 13 in Cohens v. Virginia,14 Marshall, no shrinking violet, declared the
duty of federal courts to exercise their jurisdiction: "We have no more right
to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that
which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitu-
tion." 1 Marshall, I think, was right.
Locomotive Eng'rs of Am., 398 U.S. 281, 287 (1970), and exists "to prevent needless friction
between state and federal courts," Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309
U.S. 4, 9 (1940). But see Comment, Federal Court Stays of State Court Proceedings: A Re-
examination of Original Congressional Intent, 38 U. CH1. L. REv. 612, 613, 619 (1971) (to the
effect that the statute reflects (1) fundamental congressional approval of federal court stays of
state court proceedings by means other than injunction, and (2) an intention to allow federal
courts to structure the situations in which stays will issue).
9. Until the decision of Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941), severely
curtailed the scope of judicially established exceptions, the effect of the statute was substantial-
ly diminished by restrictive judicial construction and numerous judge-made qualifications. See
generally Durfee & Sloss, Federal Injunction Against Proceedings in State Courts: The Life
History of a Statute, 30 MICH. L. REV. 1145 (1932).
Recently, the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), was excluded from
coverage under the statute. In Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), the Supreme Court held
that the Civil Rights Act came within the first statutory exception to the prohibition against
injunctions, see note 7 supra. The operative test, which the Civil Rights Act met, was stated as
being "whether an Act of Congress, clearly creating a federal right or remedy enforceable in a
federal court of equity, could be given its intended scope only by the stay of a state court
proceeding." 407 U.S. at 238.
See generally P. BAXTOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM 1234-39 (2d ed. 1973).
10. 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
1I. Otherwise stated, this is the power to uphold laws as "constitutional" or to strike
them down as "unconstitutional" and to interpret them in the process.
12. See, e.g., Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); Fletcher v.
Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
13. See text accompanying notes 6-8 infra.
14. 19 U.S. 120, 6 Wheat. 264 (1821).
15. Id. at 181, 6 Wheat at 404. For a more recent expression of Marshall's prohibition, see
Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909). There, Mr. Justice Peckham, speaking
for the majority, stated that "when a Federal court is properly appealed to in a case over which
it has by law jurisdiction, it is its duty to take such jurisdiction. ... See also McClellan v.
1978]
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For over a century the states were essentially immune from suit by
private citizens. Then, in 1908, Exparte Young,t 6 a fictional but necessary
tour de force, held that although the sovereign per se was still immune from
suit, those who acted unlawfully under its aegis could be enjoined person-
ally. 17
Following Ex parte Young, courts started issuing injunctions to re-
strain violations of rights of citizens by state officials. This produced con-
siderable protest and, as a result, the Three-Judge Court Acts18 were adopted
in 1911. Section 2281 required a trial court of three judges to restrain action
of a state officer based upon the unconstitutionality of a statewide statute or
regulation. 19 Section 1253,20 however, allowed direct appeal from such
three-judge court orders to the Supreme Court. The Congress, therefore,
with one hand restricted trial court injunctions against state officials but,
with the other hand, enlarged access to the Supreme Court in suits challeng-
ing the constitutionality of the actions of state officials.
Since the 1908 decision in Ex parte Young and the passage of the
Three-Judge Court Acts in 1911, there have been few major legislative
abridgements of federal court jurisdiction over constitutional issues. How-
ever, the courts themselves, though disdaining the anti-injunction statutes,
have created an imposing series of barricades and pitfalls (in the form of
self-imposed refusals to employ the powers of the court) against the brave
souls who seek federal court protection against unlawful use of state govern-
mental power. Among these obstacles are "standing," "ripeness," "jus-
Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 281 (1910); Stapleton v. Mitchell, 60 F. Supp. 51, 55 (D. Kan. 1945).
Although subsequent cases specifically recognize the continued viability of Willcox, see, e.g.,
England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415 (1964), the rule has never
been uniformly applied and has been qualified on numerous occasions. For example, in
Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1 (1939), the Court explained that "the broad statement
that a court having jurisdiction must exercise it ...is not universally true but has been
qualified in certain cases where the federal courts may, in their discretion, properly withhold
the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon them where there is no want of another suitable
forum." Id. at 19. See also Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 236 (1943) (dictum);
Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123, 131 (1933); Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson S.S.,
Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 422-23 (1932).
Marshall's statement has also been criticized as an inaccurate reflection of the common
law. The suggestion has been made that the "supposed absolute right" of a litigant to have the
benefit of federal jurisdiction that Congress has authorized "originat[ed] in inauspicious dicta"
and "gained respectability through repetition." Note, Power to Stay Federal Proceedings
Pending Tennination of Concurrent State Litigation, 59 YALE L.J. 978, 980-81 (1950).
16. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
17. Id. at 155-56.
18. Ch. 231, § 266, 36 Stat. 1162 (1911).
19. In 1948, the statute was reenacted as 28 U.S.C. §§ 1253, 2281,2282, 2284 (1970). Act of
June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 968. Sections 2281, 2282 and 2284 were repealed in 1976. Act of
Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, § 1, 90 Stat. 1119.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970).
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ticiability," "political question," "comity," "judicial restraint," "Our
Federalism,'"21 and "abstention."
With apologies to standing, the greatest of these is abstention.
A few key decisions, seldom unanimous, 22 demonstrate the confused
and ever-changing judicial landscape of "abstention." Abstention, modern
style, is said to have originated in the 1941 decision of the Supreme Court in
Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co. 23 The Court there held that a three-
judge court could not consider the merits of a claim by the Pullman
Company and some of its black employees that an order of the Texas
Railroad Commission, which in practice obviously prevented black people
from manning Pullman cars in Texas, was racially discriminatory. The
federal trial court was required to postpone action until such time as a suit
might be instituted in a Texas state court and a Texas state court ruling
obtained on whether the order of the Texas Railroad Commission might be
ultra vires on state grounds. 24 Such a ruling, the Court said (though on a
constitutionally irrelevant state ground), might avoid the need to decide the
racial discrimination question-a question Justice Frankfurter said was a
"sensitive area of social policy upon which the federal courts ought not to
enter unless no alternative to its adjudication is open." 25 The Court
concluded that "[f]ew public interests have a higher claim upon the discre-
tion of a federal chancellor than the avoidance of needless friction with state
policies . . ',26 The claim of human beings to the constitutional guaran-
tee of equal treatment under the law was obviously not such a "higher
claim.'"27
Two years later in Douglas v. City of Jeannette,28 the Supreme Court
created a dismissal rule which was a substantial variation of the original
21. See note 52 infra.
22. Substantial controversy over the merits of the abstention doctrine has long existed
among members of the judiciary. Leading proponents have included Justices Frankfurter,
Harlan and Jackson; principal opponents have included Justices Warren, Douglas, Brennan and
White.
23. 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (Frankfurter, J.). See Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases:
The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1071 (1974) for in-depth
analysis of Pullman and its effects.
Several cases decided prior to Pullman foreshadowed development of the abstention
doctrine. See Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573 (1940), 311 U.S. 614
(1941); Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U.S. 52 (1933); Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279
U.S. 159, 211 (1929) (alternate holding). See also Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309
U.S. 478 (1940); Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 230 (1908).
24. 312 U.S. at 501-02.
25. Id. at 498 (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 500.
27. The Court upheld the propriety of federal abstention although it went far beyond the
restrictions Congress had imposed. Id. at 501. See also note I supra.
28. 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
1978]
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abstention theory of Pullman. In Jeannette the Court upheld a United States
District Court's refusal to enjoin a state court prosecution of Jehovah's
Witnesses for violation of a city ordinance which was unlawfully restrictive
of first amendment rights of free speech.2 9 The Supreme Court said, how-
ever, that the district court did not go far enough; the trial judge had to
dismiss the suit despite the threat to free speech. Presuming the good faith of
the prosecution, the Court felt that plaintiff's constitutional rights could be
adequately protected by a state criminal trial, by appeal and by the ultimate
hope of resurrection through certiorari. 30 Federal relief was said to be
permissible, however, in exceptional cases to prevent "irreparable injury"
that was "both great and immediate. "31
Thus, where Pullman had required postponement of decision, Jean-
nette required dismissal of the suit, in the absence of exceptional circum-
stances, if a state criminal proceeding had already begun or was about to be
commenced.
3 2
Dombrowski v. Pfister,33 decided two decades later in 1965, was an
apparent second thought on the perils of abstention. A three-judge court had
abstained and dismissed a suit seeking a restraining order against threats,
prosecutions, raids and seizures by state officials, under a vague and
overbroad statute which had "chilled" or invaded plaintiffs' first amend-
ment rights.34 The Supreme Court reversed and ordered the lower court to
decide the case on the merits. 35 The Court observed:
On this view of the "vagueness" doctrine, it is readily appar-
ent that abstention serves no legitimate purpose where a statute
regulating speech is properly attacked on its face, and where, as
here, the conduct charged in the indictments is not within the reach
of an acceptable limiting construction readily to be anticipated as
29. On the same day Douglas was decided, the ordinance was held unconstitutional as
applied on review of a criminal conviction under it. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105
(1943).
30. See 319 U.S. at 163.
31. Id. at 164.
32. Pullman, unlike Douglas, requires a federal plaintiff to commence a state proceeding
that would not have been brought but for the abstention order.
33. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
34. 227 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. La. 1964). The case dealt with prosecution of appellants under
Louisiana's Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law, Law of July 7, 1962, Act No.
270, § 1, 1962 La. Laws 546 (current version at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:358-:373 (West
1974)), and the Communist Propaganda Control Law, Law of July 7, 1962, Act. No. 245, § 1,
1962 La. Laws 505 (current version at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:390-:390.8 (West 1974)). The
laws allegedly were being used by appellees in bad faith to deter appellants' civil rights activity,
not to secure valid convictions. 380 U.S. at 482.
35. 380 U.S. at 497. The holding seemed surprising because in order to obtain the desired
injunction plaintiffs had to effectively surmount three obstacles: (I) the Anti-Injunction
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970); see text accompanying notes 6-9 supra; (2) the policy against
equitable interference with the enforcement of criminal law, see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
[Vol. 56
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the result of a single criminal prosecution and is not the sort of
"hard-core" conduct that would obviously be prohibited under any
construction. In these circumstances, to abstain is to subject those
affected to the uncertainties and vagaries of criminal prosecution,
whereas the reasons for the vagueness doctrine in the area of
expression demand no less than freedom from prosecution prior to
a construction adequate to save the statute. In such cases, absten-
tion is at war with the purposes of the vagueness doctrine, which
demands appropriate federal relief regardless of the prospects for
expeditious determination of state criminal prosecutions. Although
we hold today that appellants' allegations of threats to prosecute, if
upheld, dictate appropriate equitable relief without awaiting de-
claratory judgments in the state courts, the settled rule of our cases
is that district courts retain power to modify injunctions in light of
changed circumstances. . . .Our view of the proper operation of
the vagueness doctrine does not preclude district courts from mod-
ifying injunctions to permit prosecutions in light of subsequent
state court interpretation clarifying the application of a statute to
particular conduct.
We conclude that on the allegations of the complaint, 'if true,
abstention and the denial of injunctive relief may well result in the
denial of any effective safeguards against the loss of protected
freedoms of expression, and cannot be justified.
36
Two justices dissented, 37 deploring the litigant's "race to the forum of
its own choice," 38 and expressed the view that the Court should have
abstained, but should have retained jurisdiction for further action in the
event the state did not prosecute promptly and in good faith.
39
1 Between the Dombrowski decision in 1965 and Younger v. Harris and
its companion cases in 1971, 40 the Court did not substantially elaborate on
abstention. Only two cases of any significance dealt with the issue. The
most important of these was Zwickler v. Koota ,41 which reversed a three-
judge court that had abstained and dismissed a complaint seeking declara-
tory relief and an injunction against future prosecution for the distribution of
37, 43-44 (1971); and (3) the then well established abstention doctrines. See C. WRIGHT, supra
note 2, § 52A, at 230. With respect to the third obstacle, the Court distinguished Douglas on the
ground that irreparable injury was clearly evident in Dombrowski. The Court explained that
Dombrowski presented a "situation in which defense of the State's criminal prosecution
[would] not assure adequate vindication of constitutional rights." 380 U.S. at 485-86.
36. 380 U.S. at 491-92 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
37. Justices Harlan and Clark dissented, Justice Black took no part in the consideration or
the decision of the case, and Justice Stewart took no part in the decision.
38. 380 U.S. at 502 (Harlan & Clark, JJ., dissenting). The dissent charged that to allow
such a "race" belied the considerations of federalism to which the Court paid lip-service. Id.
39. Id.
40. See text accompanying notes 46-55 infra.
41. 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
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handbills under an overbroad state statute.42 Abstention, said the Court,
citing McNeese v. Board of Education,'3 should not be used simply to
require litigants to try federal claims in state court before resorting to federal
court.44
For a brief period it was thought, that Dombrowski had started a
counter-Pullman trend. 45 That thought was short-lived. In 1971, the Su-
preme Court decided Younger v. Harris.46 A three-judge court had enjoined
a previously instituted state prosecution, under a vague statute which had
infringed appellee Harris's first amendment rights.4 7 The Court distin-
guished Dombrowski48 and held that the trial court should have abstained
from decision because, as the Supreme Court read the record, the alleged
danger of irreparable loss was not " 'both great and immediate,' "49 plain-
tiff could vindicate his rights in a single state prosecution5° and bad faith had
not been demonstrated. 51 The "chilling effect" was not enough to justify
federal "intervention" under "Our Federalism.' 52
42. Law of Mar. 27, 1941, ch. 198, § 1, 1941 N.Y. Laws 789 (formerly codified as N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 781-b (McKinney 1944)) (superseded 1965). The district court had dismissed the
case for failure to show the "special circumstances" it interpreted Dombrowski as requiring to
justify the exercise of federal court jurisdiction. Zwickler v. Koota, 261 F. Supp. 985, 991-92
(E.D.N.Y. 1966).
43. 373 U.S. 668 (1963). The Court in McNeese held that allegations of unconstitutional
racial segregation in a public school constituted a federal complaint that could be brought in
federal court despite the failure to exhaust all possible state judicial remedies. The Court
emphasized that since the right being vindicated was clearly federal in nature and in no way
entangled with state law, it was immaterial whether the conduct was legal or illegal as a matter
of state law. Id. at 674.
44. 389 U.S. at 251. The Court also corrected the district court's misreading of Dor.
browski by stating that "abstention and injunctive relief are not the same" and that " 'absten-
tion . . . is inappropriate for cases . . . where . . . statutes are justifiably attacked on their
faces as abridging free expression.' " Id. at 254 (quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. at
489-90).
45. In practice, however, the Supreme Court did nothing to encourage this view. The few
decided cases evidence a modest reading of Dombrowski. See, e.g., Cameron v. Johnson, 390
U.S. 611 (1968). See generally Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court Proceed-
ings: The Significance of Dombrowski, 48 TEx. L. REV. 535 (1970).
46. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
47. Harris was indicted for violation of the California Criminal Syndicalism Act. 401 U.S.
at 38.
48. Id. at 47-51.
49. Id. at 46 (quoting Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240,243 (1926)). Citing Exparte Young,
209 U.S. at 145-47, see text accompanying notes 16 & 17 supra, the Court explained that
irreparable injury was not established by considering the "cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of
having to defend against a single criminal prosecution," but rather by showing that "the threat
to plaintiff's federally protected rights. . . cannot be eliminated by his defense against a single
criminal prosecution." 401 U.S. at 46.
50. 401 U.S. at 49.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 50. Justice Black, emphasizing the "highly important place" occupied by "Our
Federalism," id. at 45, defined the concept as representing
a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and
National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may
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Five companion decisions, of which the most significant are Samuels
v. Mackell ,3 and Perez v. Ledesma,54 accelerated Younger's retreat from
Dombrowski.55 In Samuels, the Court held that declaratory relief was
improper when the prosecution was pending in state court at the time the
federal action was instituted. In Perez, a three-judge court was held in error
for entering an order suppressing illegally seized evidence in a previously
pending good faith criminal prosecution for sale of obscene literature.
Just as the dismissal principle of Jeannette was expanded by Younger,
so was the postponement principle of Pullman expanded56 in 1971 by Askew
v. Hargrave. 57 In Askew, a class action suit was brought against the
Governor of Florida and others, challenging the constitutionality of a Flori-
da statute58 which limited the property tax to ten mills. The statute, as
plaintiffs alleged, thereby in practice discriminated against children in poor
counties. 59 After the federal suit was filed, a separate suit was filed in state
court6° attacking the statute as violating the Florida state consitution. The
federal trial court was asked to abstain and declined to do so, 61 relying on
Monroe v. Pape62 and McNeese v. Board of Education. 63 The Supreme
Court, in a per curiam opinion, agreed that the existence of a state proceed-
ing in which a federal claim may be asserted is not grounds for requiring
abstention, but. pointed out that the Florida state case was based on Florida
state grounds which, if sustained, would obviate the fourteenth amendment
issue. 64 The Court vacated the judgment of the district court, said reliance
be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do
so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the State.
Id. at 44.
53. 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
54. 401 U.S. 82 (1971).
55. The other three cases were Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971), Dyson v. Stein,
401 U.S. 200 (1971), and Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971). In Dyson and Byrne district court
injunctions against enforcement of obscenity statutes were vacated and the cases remanded for
reconsideration in light of Younger and Samuels. Boyle, also relying on Younger and Samuels,
reversed a district court injunction prohibiting defendant state officials from "intimidation" of
Negro residents pursuant to certain Chicago statutes.
56. See note 67 infra.
57. 401 U.S. 476 (1971) (per curiam).
58. Law of July 22, 1968, ch. 68-112, § 1, 1968 Fla. Laws. 511 (formerly codified as FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 236.251 (West Supp. 1970)) (repealed 1970). The statute is commonly known as
the Millage Rollback Law.
59. 401 U.S. at 477; see Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F. Supp. 944, 948-50 (M.D. Fla. 1970).
60. 401 U.S. at 477-78.
61. The district court stated that it "could find no special circumstances. . . that would
persuade [it] to apply the doctrine of abstention. The fact that a state remedy is available is not a
valid basis for federal court abstention." Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F. Supp. 944, 947 (M.D. Fla.
1970).
62. 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (upholding a federal civil damage suit against a police officer who
violated petitioner's fourteenth amendment rights).
63. 373 U.S. 668 (1963); see note 43 supra.
64. 401 U.S. at 478.
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on Monroe and McNeese was misplaced, 65 and remanded the case for
consideration of whether the court should abstain under the reasoning of the
Pullman line of cases. 66 The Askew case, in effect, required state court
adjudication under state constitutions of issues initially presented for resolu-
tion under the Federal Constitution.
67
Many circuit and district judges watched the amoebic growth of absten-
tion gladly. Since Younger (and its mates, Samuels and Perez), the battle
over constitutional rights versus states' "rights," sub nom. "abstention,"
"equitable restraint" and "federalism," has continued apace, with most
rounds being won by "states'-righters.
'"68
Lynch v. Snepp69 is illustrative. There a North Carolina state judge
70
entered a sweeping ex parte civil restraining order prohibiting unauthorized
visitation at all one hundred and six schools in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg
school system, on the stated ground of reported "disorder" without serious
injury at one of those one hundred and six schools. The order was founded
solely on an unsworn two-page memorandum from a state district attor-
ney. 7' No criminal proceeding was pending. Admittedly unlawful for over-
breadth and lack of due process under Carroll v. President of Princess
65. Id. The Court distinguished Monroe on the ground that "there 'the state remedy,
though adequate in theory, was not available in practice.'" Id. (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. at 174). The Court's discussion of McNeese merely emphasized its holding that " 'asser-
tion of a federal claim in a federal court [need not] await an attempt to vindicate the same clain
in a state court.' " 401 U.S. at 478 (quoting McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. at 672)
(emphasis added by the Supreme Court in Askew).
66. The Court specifically referred the lower court to its decision in Reetz v. Bozanich,
397 U.S. 82 (1970), which mandated federal court abstention when certain Alaska fishing laws
and regulations were challenged as violating both the Alaska Constitution and the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution. 401 U.S. at 478. But see Wisconsin v. Constan-
tineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
67. Askew thereby extends Pullman. In Pullman and like cases the independent state law
ground, whether it arises from common law, statutory law or state constitutional law, is
substantively distinct from the federal issue. Resolution under state law obviates the federal
question and precludes federal court consideration of the case. By contrast, in Askew the
federal and state issues are not substantively severable. The state court is specifically given the
power to construe the state constitutional guarantee in a manner dissimilar to the federal one.
If, however, federal constitutional requirements are violated by the state's construction of its
own constitution, the federal courts retain the ability to reject the state's resolution and enforce
federal limitations. This type of federal oversight is absent in Pullman. Thus, the policy of
encouraging state construction of state law that pervades the Pullman decision is of much less
significance in Askew and does not effectively combat the detrimental effects of abstention in
this situation. See Bezanson, Abstention: The Supreme Court and Allocation of Judicial Power,
27 VAND. L. REv. 1107, 1129-33 (1974).
68. The Pullman variety of abstention is applied with virtual unanimity, Statutory enact-
ment of this aspect of the doctrine has been suggested. See ALI STUDY OF T11F. DiVISION OF
JURISDIcTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAl. COURTS § 1371(c) (Tentative Draft No. 6, 1968).
69. 350 F. Supp. 1134 (W.D.N.C. 1972), rev'd, 472 F.2d 769 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 983 (1973).
70. Judge Frank W. Snepp, resident North Carolina Superior Court Judge.
71. 350 F. Supp. at 1136.
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Anne,72 the order was also void under North Carolina law because no suit
had been instituted before it was entered.73 As district judge, I so held. The
overbreadth was conceded by the state judge, who suspended his original
order as to seventy-three schools as soon as he learned some of the facts.
74
The illegality of the order was also conceded by the cognizant circuit court
judge, who on motion for a stay dissolved the restraint as to all but one of
the one hundred and six schools, but reinstated it as to that one. 75 Free
speech at that school remained in suspension for half the school year, until
the court of appeals, presuming the presence of an adequate state remedy,
reversed the district court for "exceed[ing] its equitable discretion in grant-
ing injunctive relief" and upheld the state court action. 76 The court of
appeals erroneously assumed that North Carolina courts are as free with
mandamus, declaratory judgment and expedited appeals as are federal
appellate courts. 77 In fact, expedited appeals are extremely rare in North
Carolina; mandamus is not available to require a local judge to do any
positive thing;78 and there was no adequate state remedy.79
In Webster v. Perry,80 a later North Carolina abstention case, plaintiffs
showed a practice of unconstitutional racial discrimination and denial of due
process in the expulsion and suspension of students from public schools.
The pertinent statute81 was attacked as overbroad, discriminatorily applied
72. 393 U.S. 175 (1968). Here the Supreme Court emphasized the heavy presumption
against the constitutional validity of prior restraint of first amendment rights and held that ex
parte restraining orders were prohibited if "no showing is made that it is impossible to serve or
to notify the opposing parties and to give them an opportunity to participate." Id. at 180.
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1485 (Cum. Supp. 1977) and N.C.R. Civ. P. 3, 65(b) indicate that
an injunction is a remedy that must exist in conjunction with a pending suit. The filing of a
complaint or the issuance of a summons is a condition precedent to the ordering of an
injunction. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp. v. Local 61, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, I I N.C. App.
159, 180 S.E.2d 461, cert. denied, 278 N.C. 701, 181 S.E.2d 601 (1971).
74. 350 F. Supp. at 1136-37.
75. 472 F.2d at 772.
76. Id. at 775-76. The state judge later dissolved the restraint as moot.
77. The court of appeals said that in the absence of an "allegation or showing that what
overbreadth. . . exists in the superior court orders cannot be cured by an immediate appeal to
the state appellate courts, the use of prerogative writs by those courts, or even by defending at
the final trial on the merits," irreparable harm sufficient to justify federal intervention was not
present. Id.
78. See Wilkinson v. Board of Educ., 199 N.C. 669, 155 S.E. 562 (1930).
79. The court of appeals' application of Younger principles in a civil context was particu-
larly significant in view of the United States Supreme Court's express refusal to reach that
decision a year earlier. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 244 (1972) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring). See also note 87 infra. The Supreme Court did address the issue in Huffman v.
Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975); see text accompanying notes 87-96 infra.
80. 367 F. Supp. 666 (M.D.N.C. 1973).
81. N.C. GEN.STAT. § 115-147 (1975) in pertinent part provides that "[t]he principal of a
school shall have authority to suspend or dismiss any pupil who willfully and persistently
violates the rules of the school, or who may be guilty of immoral or disreputable conduct, or
who may be a menace to the school .... "
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and violative of due process rights.82 Two members of a three-judge court
abstained from dealing with the constitutional issues until the North Caroli-
na courts were given an opportunity to decide those issues under North
Carolina law,83 despite the absence of any pending state action. 84 The
majority ignored the facts that no state court action was pending and that a
North Carolina remedy for plaintiffs was nonexistent because under the
appeals statute, North Carolina General Statutes section 143-309,85 the only
possible review of the challenged action was by special petition to the
Superior Court of Wake County in Raleigh, the state capital, which is
hundreds of miles from many North Carolina school children. Furthermore,
such a petition could not even be filed after thirty days from notice of the
school board's decision, except for "good cause" shown and in the discre-
tion of the Superior Court judge.
86
In 1975 the Supreme Court further barred the doors of the federal
courthouse by extending Younger to protect state civil as well as criminal
proceedings.87 In Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.8 s an Ohio prosecutor obtained a
state civil court order, pursuant to a state nuisance statute, to padlock a
theater for one year and to seize personal property used for the display of
obscene films. Pursue, Ltd., the theater owner, without appealing the state
judgment, sued the state authorities in federal court, charging first amend-
ment and due process deprivations. The three-judge federal court, without
considering Younger, enjoined that part of the state court order which
closed the theater to films not previously judged obscene. 89 The Supreme
Court, in a six to three decision, held Younger applicable to civil proceed-
ings. 90 The Court explained that in order to attack state proceedings in
82. 367 F. Supp. at 667.
83. Id. at 668-70.
84. The federal court did not dismiss the suit, but expressly retained jurisdiction pending
litigation under North Carolina law. Id. at 668.
85. Law of Apr. 28, 1953, ch. 1094, § 4, 1953 N.C. Sess. Laws 1006 (formerly codified as'
N.C. GFtN. STAT. § 143-309 (1974)) (repealed 1974).
86. Abstention in effect defFrred "to a theory rather than to an alternative right" since
plaintiffs, if they failed to meet the rigorous requirements of former N.C. GtFN. STAT. § 143-309,
could not require the state courts to consider their plea. 367 F. Supp. at 671 (McMillan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
87. Between 1971 and 1975 the Supreme Court on three occasions had expressly declined
to rule on the applicability of Younger in the civil arena. See Speight v. Slaton, 415 U.S. 333,
334-51 (1974) (per curiam); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 575-77 (1973); Mitchum v. Foster,
407 U.S. 225, 244 (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
88. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
89. Id. at 598-99.
90. The Court, although specifically stating that Younger can apply to civil litigation, id.
at 604, refused to make a general pronouncement as to its applicability to all civil actions. Id. at
607. Also noteworthy are the critical similarities between criminal prosecution and Ohio
nuisance proceedings, the latter being more akin to a criminal action than are most other civil
causes of action. Id. at 604.
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federal court a litigant must first exhaust state appellate remedies9' unless he
can meet the Younger "bad faith," "great and immediate" and "irrepar-
able" injury standards. 92 Pursue, said the Court, "should not be permitted
the luxury of federal litigation of issues presented by ongoing state proceed-
ings. " 93 The Court expressly reserved the question whether the state court
decision would be binding should appellee lose in the state court and ask the
federal court to take up, finally, his federal constitutional claim. 94 Although
the holding of Huffman was initially received as limited to the particular
facts of the case, 95 the opinion contains sweeping language inviting broad
expansion.
96
Hicks v. Miranda97 takes Younger to its seemingly ultima thule.
Police in Orange CQunty, California, raided the Pussycat Theater and seized
copies of the film "Deep Throat." Criminal misdemeanor charges under the
state's obscenity statute 98 were filed in Orange County Municipal Court
against two employees of the theater. A civil show cause proceeding to
declare the film obscene was also instituted against appellees, the theater
and the theater employees. 99 Appellees refused to participate and reserved
91. State appellate remedies include, by implication, certiorari or appeal to the United
States Supreme Court.
92. 420 U.S. at 611-12.
93. Id. at 604 (emphasis added). Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion was supported by
two basic arguments: (I) the applicability of federalistic principles whenever States initiate
judicial proceedings, whether civil or criminal, in state courts; and (2) the traditional reluctance
of courts of equity, even within a unitary system, to enjoin criminal prosecutions or civil
proceedings in which the State is a party and which are in aid of and closely associated with
criminal laws. Id. at 604-05.
94. Id. at 606.
95. See note 90 supra & note 96 infra.
96. The Supreme Court readily accepted that invitation in the recent case Juidice v. Vail,
430 U.S. 327 (1977). There, default judgment debtors in New York were held in contempt for
failure to satisfy judgments, to attend depositions, and to give relevant information. They
brought a class action suit in federal district court, seeking to enjoin any enforcement of the
state statutory contempt provisions on federal constitutional grounds. The district court de-
clared the laws unconstitutional and permanently enjoined operation of the statute. Vail v.
Quinlan, 406 F. Supp. 951 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The Supreme Court reversed, declaring that the
federal court properly should have abstained. The Court specifically repudiated the district
court's holding that Huffman was applicable only to civil actions akin to criminal proceedings.
430 U.S. at 334. (The Court did, however, acknowledge the plausibility of the district court's
interpretation in light of the seemingly restrictive wording in the Huffman opinion. Id. at 333-
34.) In the Court's view, labeling the finding of contempt criminal, quasi-criminal or civil in
nature was immaterial. The salient fact was that the importance of the contempt power to the
administration of the state judicial system prohibited federal intervention when the parties had
an opportunity to present their federal claim at a state proceeding and did not do so. Id. at 334.
Although the Court again declined to hold Huffman applicable to all civil litigation, id. at 336
n. 13, ultimately, that result appears inevitable. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977)
(holding Younger applicable to civil enforcement action brought for return of money fraudu-
lently received through public assistance programs).
97. 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
98. CA.. PENAl. CODE §§ 311-312.5 (West 1970 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
99. A substantial confusion in the identification of the parties exists throughout this case.
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all federal questions. The state court held the film obscene and entered a
corresponding judgment against appellees which was not appealed. 10 Two
days later the film owners brought suit in federal court to enjoin further
enforcement, to have sections of the statute declared unconstitutional and to
recover the film. The district court judge found the demand for injunctive
relief unwarranted but convened a three-judge court to consider the constitu-
tionality of the statute. 10' While this federal action was pending, the munici-
pal court criminal proceedings were amended to include appellee Miranda as
an additional defendant'012 and to add four conspiracy charges. 103 The three-
judge court held the statute unconstitutional, 104 ordered dismissal of the
prosecution and found bad faith and harassment by the authorities justifying
federal intervention.105 Younger and Samuels were specifically held inap-
plicable.10 6 The court also declined to follow Miller v. California ,107 which
for want of a substantial federal question had summarily dismissed an appeal
from a lower court decision upholding the statute. 108
The Supreme Court, despite the district court's findings of fact, held
that there was no bad faith or harassment'1 9 and reversed the district court.
The Court held that Miller should have been considered" 0 and that the
The show cause order was issued against Vincent Miranda, d/b/a Pussycat Theater; Walnut
Properties, Inc.; and theater employees. Miranda owned the land on which the theater was
located and did business as Walnut Properties, Inc. The Pussycat Theater was a California
corporation of which Miranda was president and a stockholder. 422 U.S. at 335 n.2.
100. Id. at 335-36.
101. Id. at 338; see Miranda v. Hicks, 388 F. Supp. 350, 356-59 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (per
curiam).
102. The amended complaint named as defendants Vincent Miranda and Walnut Proper-
ties, Inc., 422 U.S. at 339 n.7; see note 99 supra.
103. 422 U.S. at 339.
104. Miranda v. Hicks, 388 F. Supp. 350, 356-59 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (per curiam).
105. Id. at 360.
106. Id. at 356. The district court read Younger and Samuels as limiting federal court
power to issue an injunction or decision only if state prosecution was pending. The court
specifically relied on Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974). In Steffel, the Supreme Court
reversed a federal district court's abstention from a suit brought for federal declaratory relief
from threatened state criminal prosecution. The Court reasoned that a refusal on the part of
federal courts to intervene when no state proceeding was actually pending could leave the
plaintiff with no forum in which to bring his constitutional claim, unless he chose to "institute"
criminal prosecution by violating state law. Id. at 462. The Court held that in this situation
federal intervention could not "be interpreted as reflecting negatively upon the state court's
ability to enforce constitutional principles," and the interest of the federal court in serving as
"primary guardians of constitutional rights" took precedence. Younger and Samuels were
therefore held inapposite, making federal declaratory relief appropriate. Id. at 462-63.
107. 418 U.S. 915 (1974) (mem.).
108. The lower court in Hicks specifically refused to "attach plenary precedential value to
the summary treatment" of the case. 388 F. Supp. at 364.
109. 422 U.S. at 350-51.
110. Id. at 343-45. The Court emphasized that summary disposition of an appeal, either by
affirmance or dismissal for want of a substantial federal question, is a disposition on the merits
by which lower courts are clearly bound. See generally Comment, The Precedential Weight of a
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district court should have abstained. II The Court further said that "[w]here
state criminal proceedings are begun against the federal plaintiffs after the
federal complaint is filed but before any proceedings of substance on the
merits have taken place in the federal court, the principles of Younger v.
Harris should apply in full force."'
112
Hicks v. Miranda thus injected another murky concept into this already
confused area. 1 3 The phrase "proceedings of substance on the merits" has
no predictable meaning in any particular factual context and will breed
further litigation which would be unnecessary if the Court had upheld the
trial court in the exercise of its admitted jurisdiction. The theoretical
concerns of federalism are once more paramount over the rights of man.
Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.,114 introduces a further irony resulting from a
vigorous application of the reasoning of Hicks. Suit was brought in federal
court on behalf of three bars seeking an injunction against enforcement of an
allegedly unconstitutional topless dancing ordinance. All three bars operated
for a time in compliance with the ordinance. However, before the scheduled
hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction took place, M & L, one of
the three bars, resumed topless dancing and was served with a state criminal
summons based on violation of the ordinance. The district court enjoined all
three state prosecutions 15 and the Second Circuit affirmed.'
16
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the two compliant bars were
entitled to relief because they proved irreparable harm, 117 and were therefore
not subject to Younger.1 8 Younger, however, was held applicable to M &
L because, though the federal suit was begun first, "the federal litigation
was in an embryonic stage and no contested matter had been decided.""l 9
Dismissal by the Supreme Court for Want of a Substantial Federal Question: Some Implications
of Hicks v. Miranda, 76 Cot.uNi. L. RFv. 508 (1976).
I1. 422 U.S. at 348-52. The Court corrected the district court's reading of Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974); see note 106 supra, squarely stating that Younger may be
applicable even though state criminal proceedings are not pending on the day the federal case is
filed. 422 U.S. at 349.
112. 422 U.S. at 349 (emphasis added).
113. The opinion has been subject to a host of other criticism. See generally Recent
Developments, Federal Courts-Abstention-Dismissal of Federal Action Mandated if Plaintiff
Is Able to Have Claim Adjudicated in a Parallel State Proceeding or if State Proceeding Is
Instituted Against Him While Federal Case Is Still in an Early Stage, 21 Viui.. L. REV. 317
(1976).
114. 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
115. Salem Inn,Inc. v. Frank, 364 F. Supp. 478 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
116. Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 501 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1974).
117. The irreparable harm was financial in nature, defined as "substantial loss of business
and perhaps even bankruptcy." 422 U.S. at 932.
118. Id. at 930-31.
119. Id. at 929 (emphasis added). Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974); see notes 106
& I I I supra, thus died in infancy.
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One is left to wonder whether the various trimesters of the "embryonic"
litigation might merit different treatments.
The Doran Court also held that the lower court decision could not be
sustained on the theory that, with all three companion cases in the federal
court, judicial economy would be served by handling them all together.
Such concerns, the Court explained, must be subordinated to the concepts of
federalism.120 Younger conquers all.' 2
Abstention comes in various costumes. 122 One of the reasons for the
delay required by Pullman was to await a state law decision which might
obviate a constitutional decision. Younger and Pullman both require defer-
ence to the view of local officials and judges. Huffman calls the pursuit of
human rights in federal court a "luxury." "Federalism" is another amor-
phous theory advanced to support abstention. "Equity" and "comity" get
big play.
Some of the abstention results make good sense, 123 if the theory and
language, and the inhibition of lower courts, were not so alarming. Normal-
ly, a previously pending criminal prosecution, plus certiorari, does provide
a forum to assert constitutional claims. I almost always postpone a federal
decision if a state court already has the identical issue in litigation and no
unusual circumstances appear; that is plain economy. 1
24
Recent cases, however, show an alarming trend. They exalt "judicial
administration" over justice and theory over substance. Moreover, as Mr.
Justice Black said in Younger, "The precise reasons for this long-standing
policy against federal court interference with state court proceedings have
never been specifically identified ....
The theories, spoken and unspoken, underlying abstention include
these: (1) Constitutional rights of man are secondary to theories of "federal-
ism"; (2) "'federalism" can survive best if federal courts avoid "sensitive"
questions and defer to state and local judges when possible; (3) postpone-
ment, avoidance and delay produce better or "riper" decisions of constitu-
tional questions; (4) especially since the work of courts is heavy, the courts
120. 422 U.S. at 928.
121. For critical comment on the Court's application of Younger in this case, see The
Supreme Court 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REv. 47, 166-69 (1975).
122. See notes 2 & 3 supra.
123. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), though never mentioning Dombrowski,
draws upon its principles to uphold, six to three, a lower court injunction against prosecution of
a motorist for effacing the "Live Free or Die" motto on his New Hampshire license tag. The
result is a good one, but the case amply illustrates a major point of this article-that abstention
decisions have created uncertainty and confusion where neither is needed.
124. See, e.g., Broyhill v. Morris, 408 F.2d 820 (4th Cir. 1969).
125. 401 U.S. at 43.
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should reduce their own load by getting rid of, or postponing, "touchy"
cases, rather than deciding them on their merits; and (5) small-time constitu-
tional litigation is not welcome in the federal courts. Do these theories really
withstand scrutiny?
The Constitution prescribes rights and liberties of people and limits on
the power of government. "States' rights," "federalism," "comity,"
"abstention," "standing" and "ripeness" are not mentioned in the
Constitution; nor is the pleasure of judges or other public officials. Constitu-
tional rights, under our "Supreme Law of the Land,"1 26 are superior to all
powers of government. Government is instituted, we are told, "to secure"
these rights.
27
If the Constitution rather than temporary local sentiment is really the
"Supreme Law of the Land," why should not constitutional decisions in
this shrinking world be the everyday rather than the occasional stuff of
judgments?
To postpone, delay or abstain, regardless of the rationale, is the
equivalent of a decision on the merits, at least pro tempore, for the party
who profits by delay. Abstention subordinates the rights of people, whose
rights are guaranteed in the Constitution, to the demands of state govern-
ments, to which the Constitution gives not rights but duties, and to the
demands of local governments, which the Constitution does not mention at
all.
State and local governments threaten human rights far more than the
federal government; they touch our lives more frequently and more person-
ally. In 1974 and 1975, for example, eighty-two civil rights suits were filed
in the United States District Court in Charlotte, North Carolina, against state
and local officials, compared with only six such suits against federal offi-
cials.
State and local governments employed 12 million civilians in 1975128
compared with federal employment of 2.75 million in civilian service 129 and
2.2 million in the military. 130 Over 4 out of 5 civilian government officials
in 1975 were thus state rather than federal. By November 1977, state and
local employees had increased in number to 12,677,000, while federal
civilian employment had further shrunk to 2,731,000 persons. 131 Between
126. U.S. CONST. art. VI; see text accompanying note 4 supra.
127. U.S. CONST. preamble.
128. THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS 224 table B-32 (1977).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 218 table B-27.
131. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, ECONOMIC INDICATORS DECEMBER 1977, at 14 table
(1977).
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1945 and 1975, state and local spending increased over 25-fold, from $9
billion to $227.5 billion,132 while federal spending for all purposes, military
and civilian, increased less than 4-fold, from $84.6 billion in 1945 to $357.8
billion in 1975.133
Power tends to currupt conscientious local and state officials just as
much as it tends to corrupt Presidents and judges. Local officials are usually
in tune with temporary local sentiment; that is how they get elected. Few
people need the Constitution if local officials approve of their views and
their deeds. Few people are protected by the Constitution if the courts count
the local votes or wet a finger to the local political winds before deciding
whether to decide their cases.
No data have been advanced to show that postponement or evasion of
judicial decision produces better results, or better reasoned results, or more
acceptable results, or more economical results. Abstention creates work and
expense rather than reducing work, for judges and for lawyers. It leaves
lower courts and litigants in limbo until decisions are finally made. For
example, abstention to await state law rulings on state law issues cost the
litigants six years of delay in the Spector Motor Services, Inc. 134 litigation;
five years to ultimate abandonment of the fight in Government & Civic
Employees Organizing Committee v. Windsor;135 nine years in England v.
Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners;136 twelve years in United
States v. Leiter Minerals , 137 to a dismissal for mootness eight years after
132. THE ANNUAl. REPORT OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMic ADVISERS, supra note 128, at 270
table B-71.
133. Id.
134. See Spector Motor Servs., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 47 F. Supp. 671 (D. Conn. 1942), rev'd
sub nom. Spector Motor Servs., Inc. v. Walsh, 139 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated sub nom.
Spector Motor Servs., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944); Spector Motor Servs., Inc. v.
Walsh, 135 Conn. 36, 61 A.2d 89 (1948); Spector Motor Servs., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 88 F. Supp.
711 (D. Conn. 1949), rev'd sub nom. Spector Motor Servs., Inc. v. O'Connor, 181 F.2d 150 (2d
Cir. 1950), rev'd, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
135. See Government & Civic Employees Organizing Comm. v. Windsor, 116 F. Supp. 354
(N.D. Ala. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 901 (1954); Government & Civic Employees
Organizing Comm. v. Windsor, 262 Ala. 285, 70 So. 2d 646 (1955); Government & Civic
Employees Organizing Comm. v. Windsor, 146 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Ala.) (per curiam), vacated
and remanded, 353 U.S. 364 (1956); American Fed'n of State, County & Mull. Employees v.
Dawkins, 268 Ala. 13, 104 So. 2d 827 (1958).
136. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 259 F.2d 626 (5th Cir. 1958),
rehearing denied, 263 F.2d 661 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1012 (1959); England v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 180 F. Supp. 121 (E.D. La. 1960); England v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 126 So. 2d 51 (La. Ct. App. 1960), cert. denied, 126 So.
2d 51 (La. 1961); England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Med. Examiners; 194 F. Supp. 521 (1961),
rev'd, 375 U.S. 411 (1964); England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 246 F. Supp.
993 (E.D. La.), aff'd per curiam, 384 U.S. 885 (1965).
137. See United States v. Leiter Minerals, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 439 (E.D. La. 1954), aff'd,
224 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1955), modified and aff'd, 352 U.S. 220 (1957); Leiter Minerals, Inc. v.
California Co., 239 La. 116, 118 So. 2d 124 (1960); Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. California Co., 126
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abstention was ordered; and eight years in Louisiana Power & Light Co. v.
City of Thibodaux. 1
38
Historically, federal judges are freer to follow the Constitution than are
state judges. The Supreme Court in Monroe v. Pape 39 noted that federal
courts are the forum contemplated by the Civil Rights Acts because they are
less likely than state courts to bend to local pressures."1 Abstention, 1978-
style, tends to neutralize the 400 federal trial judges and to deny constitu-
tional litigants the fact-finding services and independence of the judges most
free to recognize and protect constitutional rights.
If res judicata and estoppel should be held to apply against federal
relitigation of "abstained" cases which state courts decide, the Constitution
can tend to become the monopoly of state judges.
Appeal and certiorari from state court decisions to the United States
Supreme Court are a rugged obstacle course, despite section 1257.141 When
we consider the rarity of certiorari and the number of cases disposed of by
summary affirmance or on the grounds that certiorari was improvidently
granted, 42 the hope or possibility of Supreme Court review is cold comfort
to the constitutional litigant when the federal district court has been required
to abstain.
Federal courts cost only about one penny out of every $13.00 or $14.00
of federal spending. 43 The federal judiciary should try harder to get more
and better judges and support personnel and facilities, rather than try to
lighten its own load by refusing to do its primary job-to decide constitu-
tional questions. If abstention is to be required because there may be a state
remedy, why not use that raw power to deny relief, first to eliminate
diversity cases, which almost always involve state law? Why not abstain in
patent and antitrust and contract suits-the usual sources of the longest
trials-rather than eliminate or delay cases involving the "Supreme Law of
So. 2d 76 (La. Ct. App.), rev'd, 241 La. 915, 132 So. 2d 845 (1961); United States v. Leiter
Minerals, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. La. 1962), rev'd, 329 F.2d 85 (5th Cir. 1964), dismissed
per curiam as moot, 381 U.S. 413 (1965).
138. See City of Thibodaux v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 153 F. Supp. 515 (E.D. La.
1957), rev'd, 255 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1958), rev'd, 360 U.S. 25, rehearing denied, 360 U.S. 940
(1959); City of Thibodaux v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 126 So. 2d 24 (La. Ct. App. 1960),
cert. denied, 126 So. 2d 24 (La. 1961); City of Thibodaux v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 225
F. Supp. 657 (E.D. La. 1963), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 373 F.2d 870 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 975 (1967).
139. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
140. Id. at 180.
141. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1970) allows appeal from state court judgments upholding the
validity of state statutes challenged on federal constitutional grounds.
142. See The Supreme Court 1974 Term, supra note 121, at 278. See also R. STERN & E.
GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 148 n.4 (4th ed. 1969).
143. Compare Act of July 14, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-362, Title VI, 90 Stat. 937, with THE
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the Land," the Constitution, the repository of our liberties? Our high-level
priorities are all mixed up.
Appellate courts take reams of pages and scores of cases to deal with
abstention, and other literature on the subject is voluminous. 144 This brief
comment can only touch the tips of the icebergs. The power of the leisurely
mind to ask questions and to qualify any simple or readily understandable
statement is greater than my power to anticipate and answer such questions.
As a trial judge, I spend my time grappling with facts rather than with the
nuances of judicial theory. But I do claim a deep interest in supporting and
living by the Constitution and in preserving and perfecting the judicial
process and the people it serves.
With others, I know the fragile nature of the judicial process, and the
feeling of trying to catch a whale on an eight-pound line which a judge has
when attempting to persuade reluctant litigants to follow the Constitution. I
know the wearing strain upon a resident federal judge in a populous district,
whose calendar presents an almost unbroken phalanx of cases the decisions
of which, if correct, will usually produce criticism and bitterness among
neighbors and public officials. Abstention, in that atmosphere, is an inviting
sanctuary. But the job of a judge is to decide. In America, the duty to make
the Constitution live falls heavily upon the courts.
My message is simple: federal courts should spend less time on
theories of nonjurisdiction and the niceties of abstention, and should ordi-
narily decide on the merits constitutional issues within their jurisdiction
whenever they are fairly presented, unless the litigants are already involved
in a proceeding in some other court where they are likely to get a fair and
timely hearing.
The highest calling of federal courts is to protect people in the exercise
of constitutional rights and freedom. Convenience and work load of judges
are not concerns of high priority by comparison. Federalism-the optimum
distribution and balance of governmental power-is best served when all
government routinely respects the Constitution and human liberty.
Abstention is a self-inflicted wound; I hope we can stop twisting the
knife in that wound before the federal judiciary makes itself a weak bystand-
er in the continuing battle over freedom in America.
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMic ADVISERS, supra note 128, at 267 table B-68
(derived).
144. In addition to the sources cited throughout this article, see generally Kurland, Toward
a Co-operative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481
(1960); Pell, Abstention-A Primrose Path byAny OtherName, 21 DF PAUL L. REV. 926 (1972);
Schoenfeld, American Federalism and the Abstention Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 73 DICK.
L. REV. 605 (1969); Note, Consequences of Abstention by a Federal Court, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1358 (1960); Note, Abstention: An Exercise in Federalism, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 226 (1959).
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